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B efore the eurozone came into existence on January 1, 1999, the conventional wisdom was that it would cause its least productive members—Portugal, Spain, and Ireland, and, later, Greece—to modernize their economies. In 
the past, these peripheral European countries had used devaluations to recover from 
adverse business cycle shocks, but without correcting the underlying imbalances of 
their economies. The arrival of the euro was expected to force a sound fi scal policy, 
eliminate the bias toward infl ation, and encourage widespread structural reforms.
For example, Lucas Papademos, who later became Prime Minister of Greece in 
2011 and 2012, but who was Governor of the Central Bank back in 2001, stated at a 
conference to mark Greece’s entry to the euro:
After entry into the euro area, the Bank of Greece will be implementing the 
single monetary policy decided by the Governing Council of the European 
Central Bank and it will certainly be impossible to improve the economy’s 
international competitiveness by changing the exchange rate of our new cur-
rency, the euro. The objectives of higher employment and output growth will 
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therefore have to be pursued through structural reforms and fi scal measures 
aimed at enhancing international competitiveness by increasing productivity, 
improving the quality of Greek goods and services and securing price stability 
(Papademos 2001, p. xxxvii).
A number of academic authors made similar predictions. For instance, 
Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2000) wrote: “Indeed the conventional wisdom is that 
EMU [economic and monetary union] will eventually remove some barriers to 
reform.” Bean (1998) argued that, once monetary and fi scal policies were out of 
the hands of governments, they would have no alternative but to carry out reforms.
The elimination of exchange rate risk, an accommodative monetary policy, and 
the worldwide ease in fi nancial conditions resulted in a large drop in interest rates 
and a rush of fi nancing into the peripheral countries, which traditionally had been 
deprived of capital. Figure 1 shows the convergence in interest rates, which resulted 
in much lower interest rates for Ireland, Greece, Spain, and Portugal—indeed, they 
became able to borrow at German-level interest rates. This paper argues that, as the 
euro facilitated large fl ows of capital and a fi nancial bubble in peripheral countries, 
economic reforms were abandoned, institutions deteriorated, the response to the 
credit bubble was delayed, and the growth prospects of these countries declined.1
In the next section, we explore the two main channels through which these 
large infl ows of capital led to the abandonment of economic reforms. First, 
these capital infl ows relaxed the economic constraints under which agents were 
acting, thus reducing the pressure for reforms. Second, they made it harder for 
principals to extract signals about who was performing well or poorly. When all 
banks are delivering great profi ts, all managers look competent; when all coun-
tries are delivering the public goods demanded by voters, all governments look 
effi cient. As a result, bad agents are not fi red, incompetent managers keep their 
jobs, and ineffi cient governments are reelected. The efforts to reform key insti-
tutions that burden long-run growth, such as rigid labor markets, monopolized 
product markets, failed educational systems, or hugely distortionary tax systems 
plagued by tax evasion, were abandoned or even reversed. It is often argued that 
the infl ow of capital to the peripheral countries led to a number of diffi culties, 
such as a debt overhang from excessive borrowing. But in our view, the reform 
reversal and institutional deterioration suffered by these countries are likely to 
have the largest negative consequences for growth.
1 Although there are alternative explanations for the euro crisis, the view that the credit bubble itself is 
the source of the disturbance is hard to counter. Lane and McQuade (2012) report a strong correlation 
between net debt fl ows and domestic credit: the ability of banks to raise external fi nance was crucial in 
allowing lending to increase faster than deposits, helping to fi nance construction booms and public 
debt. Similarly, Lane (2012) documents how the nontraded sector expanded strongly in the defi cit coun-
tries, such as Greece, Spain, and Ireland, while it contracted in surplus countries, such as Germany. Our 
reading of the evidence is thus that the causality mainly runs from the credit bubble to the real changes 
and not in the opposite direction.
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We discuss how these dynamics played out in distinctive ways in fi ve specifi c 
countries. The fi rst four countries—Spain, Ireland, Greece, and Portugal—are the 
four  countries with some bailout programs from the European Union as of early 
2013. In these countries, instead of the euro leading to a modernization of periph-
eral Europe, it became the sedative against any reform. While we believe that similar 
dynamics operate in other countries, such as Italy and France, we will not explore 
those examples here. By way of contrast, we then turn to a discussion of Germany, 
which did not enjoy a loosening of its fi nancing conditions as a result of the euro. 
Faced with a limited margin of maneuver and a stagnant economy, Germany chose 
the path of structural reforms, and as a result, the underlying divergence in economic 
policies and institutions between Germany and the other four countries discussed here 
increased, rather than diminished, as a result of the dynamics induced by the euro.
The Political Economy of Reforms, Institutions, and Monetary Unions
The euro project had four goals (see James, 2012, for a historical narrative): 
1) to build a unifi ed European identity; 2) to eliminate nominal exchange rate fl uc-
tuations and the imbalances that those could create (and in particular, to channel 
the export dynamism that Germany had displayed since the 1960s); 3) to create a 
Figure 1
Convergence in Yield for Government Bonds
(10 year yields in percent; monthly from 1993M01 to 2005M12)
Source: Eurostat.
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monetary authority isolated from political pressures; and 4) to broaden support for 
structural, supply-side reforms to improve Europe’s growth rate. This fourth goal is 
the main focus of this paper. The main channel through which a monetary union 
was thought to affect the political economy of reform was by imposing additional 
constraints on monetary and fi scal policy. In fact, the steep drop in interest rates in 
the peripheral countries allowed by the euro meant that the budget constraints that 
these countries faced were loosened, rather than tightened. Moreover, the resulting 
fi nancial bubble fueled the deterioration of governance and of the institutional 
arrangements on the euro periphery. Because of this deterioration, the euro may 
have led to a persistently negative impact on those peripheral countries.
How does an irrevocably fi xed exchange rate regime affect the political 
economy of reform? How does fi nancial integration, and the ensuing credit boom, 
alter this logic? And how persistent are these effects?
The Arguments 15 Years Ago: Reforms under Fixed Exchange Rates
The debate on the euro typically focused on how the new currency would 
affect trade, macroeconomic performance, and international fi nance, but it largely 
ignored the political economy channel, which in retrospect proved to be crucial. 
The pre-euro literature that touched on these issues (summarized in Bean 1998) 
presented two political economy reasons why the euro would facilitate structural 
reforms. First, governments with less ability to use demand-side policies to lower 
unemployment would have no choice but to use structural reforms as a substitute. 
Second, the euro would increase the market discipline on government borrowing 
because investors would be able to compare investment opportunities across coun-
tries without concern for exchange rate risk. The 1989 Delors Report that informed 
the creation of the euro expected this market discipline to be even more formidable 
than the formal constraints of the Maastricht Treaty.
Some researchers did worry that the opposite effect might occur. The absence 
of an accommodating monetary and fi scal policy would mean that structural reforms 
would have to be undertaken “without anesthesia,” increasing the pain that must be 
endured by losers and making it less likely that the reforms could be implemented. 
Chari and Kehoe (2008) also pointed out the danger of “free-riding” in a monetary 
union. Given that the effects of labor market policies, bank supervision, or fi scal 
policy of an individual country could negatively affect the welfare of the entire 
union, the monetary authority could be forced, by the uncoordinated action of its 
members acting individually, to generate high infl ation.
However, during its fi rst years, the euro played a very different role than the 
ones predicted by much of the literature: instead of tightening government budget 
constraints, it loosened them—and, thus, gave national governments a tool to avoid 
painful reforms.
Booms, Reforms, and Information Extraction: Selection and Incentives
The euro caused a gigantic credit infl ow to the peripheral countries. As Figure 2 
shows, while Ireland, Greece, Spain, and Portugal all started the millennium with 
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sustainable external debt positions, by 2010 all four countries had reached net 
external debt (the value of the domestic assets owned by foreigners less the value 
of the assets that nationals owns abroad) close to 100 percent of GDP, through the 
accumulation of either public (Greece and Portugal) or private (Spain and Ireland) 
debt. These unprecedented fi nancial booms allowed these countries to expand 
their public budgets, paying for this either directly through historically cheap debt 
issuance, as in Greece or Portugal, or through the tax revenue related to the real 
estate bubble, as in Spain and Ireland.
The consequences for economic reform of such a windfall would not have 
surprised researchers studying foreign aid. Alesina and Drazen (1991) have argued 
that the political decision process for economic reform is a war of attrition in which 
all groups try to delay the reform (with a cost to all) until one group has no more 
“budget” and gives up, bearing the largest cost. Casella and Eichengreen (1996) 
show that, in this context, foreign aid will delay concessions and reforms. Svensson 
(1999), in a game-theoretic model, shows that any windfall(including aid) increases 
rent-seeking and reduces productive public spending, and he presents empirical 
evidence (see also Drazen 2000) consistent with the proposition that aid delays 
reforms. Vamvakidis (2007) extends these arguments to the case of fi nancial booms: 
he uses a panel of 81 developing and emerging countries to show that increases in 
external debt are correlated with slowdowns in economic reforms.
Figure 2
External Indebtedness
(net international investment position as a percentage of GDP)
Source: Eurostat.
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We propose here a second channel linking a fi nancial boom to the political 
economy of reform, unrelated to the “tightness” of the budget constraints: through 
its effect on the ability of principals to extract performance information on both 
fi nancial institutions and governmental agencies.2 It is hard to obtain good signals 
of performance in a bubble. As Warren Buffet famously put it, “You never know 
who’s swimming naked until the tide goes out.” During a bubble, accountability 
is lost. A manager of a savings bank (a caja) in Spain, or of a Greek pension fund, 
can make bad decisions without negative short-run consequences, because rising 
asset prices hide their mistakes. Managers and politicians understand that, thanks to 
the bubble, they can extract more rents without fear of punishment. Consequently, 
governance deteriorates and weak institutions become weaker.
To understand this mechanism, one can view the quality of governance as 
a stock of intangible capital. Voters, shareholders, lenders, and other interested 
parties invest in this stock of governance capital when they imperfectly observe a 
sequence of actions by the agent and a sequence of outcomes and then infer how 
good the agent is. Without such investment, the stock of governance depreciates. 
Governance can be thought of as a stock because it has a persistent effect. For 
example, bad decisions lead to more bad decisions: naming someone to a bank 
board without background in banking but who is politically well-connected leads to 
persistent low governance as he stuffs the board with like-minded individuals more 
interested in repaying the favor than in monitoring the bank’s fi nancial statements.
In this context, a fi nancial boom makes signal extraction harder because all 
observed outcomes are positive. This increased diffi culty of signal extraction has 
negative consequences for selection as bad agents are not fi red. When a crisis hits 
and there is an acute need for quality leadership, it is less likely to be available. 
Negative consequences for incentives also arise. When there is a lower probability 
of underperformance being detected, agents exert less effort.
There are three additional factors that will amplify these mechanisms. First, 
when downside risk is perceived as being capped by quasi–sovereign-guarantees 
by the other member states of the monetary union, both on states (Greece and 
Portugal) and on banks or savings institutions (Spain and Ireland), voters, share-
holders, and investors worry less about losses and decrease their investment in 
monitoring. Second, during the boom times, agents have considerable discretion 
over the timing of payoffs and can choose to generate large positive payoffs up 
front and postpone the negative ones. For instance, bank managers can issue 
highly risky loans that deliver high yields in the short run and that will only become 
nonperforming years later. Politicians can implement popular spending programs 
that, while initially cheap, have costs that will escalate over time. Third, signal 
extraction may be harder when economic activity is concentrated in real estate or 
fi nance, rather than in manufacturing, because measuring the fundamentals of 
output and productivity is harder in both of these fi elds. Finally, behavioral biases 
2 In a working paper, we present a fuller description of the basic equations of such a model and of the 
underlying mechanisms (Fernández-Villaverde, Garicano, and Santos 2013). 
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also contribute to the diffi culty in providing appropriate incentives during booms. 
Agents observe positive outcomes and become overconfi dent about their abilities 
and more likely to overreach.
In short, booms cause the quality of the available signals of performance to 
deteriorate for a number of reasons—statistical, strategic, and behavioral—and, as a 
result, governance deteriorates as well. Our next step is to argue how this deteriora-
tion makes the effects of a negative macroeconomic shock more persistent.
Persistence of the Effects of Bubbles on Governance and Performance: Causes 
and Channels
It is not immediately obvious why a country’s ability to borrow at low nominal 
interest rates would lead to persistently lower growth rates. But here are four 
possible reasons.
First, governments that can borrow freely are more likely to waste resources on 
investments such as airports in the middle of nowhere. Some classic examples are 
the grandiose investments of oil producers in the 1970s (Gelb 1988). These unpro-
ductive expenditures create persistently lower growth since they involve multiyear 
commitments that must be funded through future distortionary taxation.
Second, countries with easy access to capital suffer a variant of the “Dutch 
disease” (Sachs and Warner 1995). The credit bubble induces relative price 
changes that shift the allocation of physical and human capital toward activities 
such as construction investment and away from the production of tradable goods. 
While some of the physical inputs can be moved back to the tradable goods sector 
after the bubble explodes, others are sector-specifi c and have little scrap value. 
Human capital investments (or the lack thereof) are sticky, too. In the European 
periphery, a large part of the work force is simply too poorly prepared to function 
in a knowledge economy.
Third, the literature on fi nancial frictions has argued that the recovery from 
fi nancial crisis is inherently slow because agents suffer from a debt overhang in 
which all sectors of the economy need to deleverage (Bernanke, Gertler, and 
Gilchrist 1999; Reinhart and Rogoff 2009).
Fourth, a bubble can lead, as we argued above, to a deterioration in economic 
policy and institutions so that the political economy of fi nance booms itself becomes 
a drag on recovery. Debt buys time and can be used to postpone reforms. Low-
quality agents are in place throughout the economy, and they will employ every 
trick imaginable to stay in place (after all, for some of them, staying in power may 
be the only realistic alternative to a prison term). When politicians dismantle the 
human capital of a central bank to better make it a servant of their own interests, it 
takes years to rebuild the institution. Similarly, bad management at the top of a fi rm 
damages the quality of middle management.
Moreover, weakened institutions affect the political-economic equilibrium by 
strengthening the forces against reform and providing few rewards for those in favor 
of reform. Normally, a group’s political success refl ects its economic success: if a 
group grows, its lobby power will be larger and it will be able to push for institutions 
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favorable to its interests (North, 1990). In a real estate bubble, money fl ows into the 
coffers of developers and builders, allowing them to increase their political power. 
At the same time, the agents in the tradable goods sector have less income and 
employ fewer workers, reducing their political infl uence. That is, the bubble creates 
its own constituency that is only interested in the bubble continuing. And even after 
the bubble has burst, the constituency is reluctant to accept the required changes 
in policy.
In the next few sections, we apply this framework to the experiences of 
Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and Greece and discuss how the relaxation of the credit 
constraints delayed either the transition to a different path for economic growth or 
the adoption of reforms. We then argue that the same circumstances that allowed 
delays in the periphery actually forced reform on a reluctant Germany.
Spain: The Infernal Triangle of Local Governments, Developers, 
and Cajas
The years before the euro were auspicious ones for reform efforts in Spain. 
Its fi scal position was consolidated, a wave of privatizations created strong multi-
nationals such as Teléfonica, and global, competitive companies such as Inditex 
(Zara) and Iberdrola emerged. The fi nancial system was strong and well capitalized.
But Spain’s real estate bubble ended the reform impulse. Between 1999 and 
2007, Spain experienced a period of rapid growth, averaging an annual rate of 
3.6 percent. This growth was fostered by the adoption of the euro: real interest rates 
dropped by 10 percentage points between 1990 and 2005. During this expansion, 
the grave problems in the Spanish labor market, education system, and institutional 
design went untouched or worsened. Meager attempts at reforming the sclerotic 
labor market in 2002 were abandoned, the educational system suffered an increase 
in the dropout rate, and local governments were infected by the pervasive corrup-
tion engendered by the real estate boom ( Juan 2011).
The drop in interest rates had a distinctive effect in Spain because Spaniards 
have historically held a large share of their wealth in real estate: 83 percent of house-
holds live in dwellings they own and 80 percent of Spaniards’ wealth is invested 
in real estate, a signifi cantly larger share than in other countries (Bover 2011). 
Moreover, most mortgages have variable interest rates. Finally, Spain received large 
immigrant infl ows: foreign-born residents went from 2 percent of the Spanish popu-
lation to 12 percent between 1999 and 2009 (González and Ortega 2009).
During the years of the economic boom, observers noted some disturbing 
underlying patterns. First, total factor productivity was stagnant: all of Spain’s growth 
between 1995 and 2007 was due to using more labor and capital. Second, external 
imbalances were rising. Exports of goods and services grew at an annual rate of 
8.5 percent from 1995 to 2008, but imports grew at an annual rate of 10.1 percent. 
The consequent large current account defi cits meant that, from 2000 to 2009, Spain 
required 520 billion euros of external fi nancing (in undiscounted terms). The end 
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result was a severe deterioration of Spain’s net international investment position. 
Third, a real estate boom was apparent: at the peak, 25 percent of all male Spanish 
workers were employed in construction (Bonhomme and Hospido 2012). Fourth, 
the real estate boom and bust led to a similar pattern in government revenues. 
From 1998 to 2007, government revenues from income and value-added taxes 
rose by about 140 percent; then from 2007 to 2009, they fell by about 25 percent 
and have remained low since. A large share of this change was due to the spike 
in housing transactions (Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramírez 2009). During 
the revenue boom, Spain’s government committed itself to expenditure programs 
that, given the cyclical nature of the revenue, were not sustainable. Observers and 
policymakers were aware of these patterns but no credible measures to correct this 
situation were undertaken.3
While some factors like the drop in real interest rates, favorable demographics, 
and the surge of immigration contributed to the start of the real estate boom in 
Spain, political economy factors added fuel to the fi re with a self-reinforcing triangle 
of regional governments, developers, and a type of savings banks called cajas.
A key aspect of the transition from dictatorship to democracy in Spain was an 
ambitious decentralization process with the creation of 17 autonomous regions. In 
1997, the Spanish Constitutional Court gave regions nearly complete control over 
zoning, which had before relied on urban development plans approved decades 
in advance. The new rules adopted in most regions let private developers or land-
owners present to the city council detailed plans to build a whole area of a township. 
The township would usually receive payment in terms of lots or cash. Eminent 
domain clauses could be used to force land owners to sell to the developer at some 
“fair price.” If the city council approved the plan, the developers and landowners 
were not bound by any previous zoning restriction. With these changes in place, an 
entrepreneur could make millions of euros developing areas that had never been 
on the market before, with the approval of only a city council and the signature of a 
mayor. Widespread corruption followed. Moreover, since the city would also receive 
“legal” payments from the developer in cash or in lots, land development became 
an important revenue source for local authorities, which could use the new-found 
riches to fi nance public programs.
For well-connected individuals, this path to unprecedented wealth only 
needed someone to fi nance the whole operation. The Spanish fi nancial system 
was divided into two more-or-less equal parts between the nonprofi t cajas sector 
and the for-profi t bank segment. The cajas were originally created to provide 
3 For example, in 2003, Miguel Angel Fernández Ordóñez, the Governor of the Bank of Spain from 
2006 to 2012, warned of increasing debt levels and of the lack of productivity growth (“El legado de 
Rato,” El País, September 11th 2003). Miguel Sebastián, an economist who became the main economic 
advisor of Prime Minister Rodríguez Zapatero, wrote numerous op-eds warning of the imbalances 
building in the Spanish economy. The banking supervision staff of the Bank of Spain took the unprec-
edented step in 2006 of writing a memo to the minister of fi nance denouncing the complacency of 
the then Governor of the Bank of Spain, Jaime Caruana, in regard to the imbalances building in the 
Spanish fi nancial sector.
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local banking services to the middle-class and working population often ignored 
by traditional banks, and traditionally had had a strong territorial basis and a 
conservative outlook.
Two key aspects of the regulation of cajas changed with the arrival of democ-
racy. First, the control of the cajas was transferred to the regions in 1985, opening 
the door to their capture by local politicians. Second, the cajas were allowed to 
expand territorially outside their original small area of activity. As a result, the cajas 
engaged in a relentless geographic diversifi cation and the number of branches 
skyrocketed. By January 1, 2008, Spain had almost 25,000  caja branches, one for 
every 1,800  inhabitants. Not surprisingly, over this period the cajas were continu-
ously gaining market share versus banks: back in the 1960s, Spain’s banks had about 
90 percent of the banking market, while the cajas had 10 percent; by around 2004, 
the cajas had a larger market share in Spain than the banks. The 1985 law did not 
clarify the procedure to be followed for the recapitalization of an insolvent caja, 
which turned out to be a fatal fl aw when the crisis came and there was considerable 
uncertainty regarding this matter.
The cajas started channeling lending in an indiscriminate manner to real 
estate developers. Between 1995 and 2005, lending for construction and develop-
ment went from 8 percent to 29 percent of GDP, and lending to households for 
housing purchases grew from 17 percent of GDP to 49 percent (Beltrán et al. 2010). 
This lending boom was accompanied by a boom in construction. The number of 
housing units built every year went steadily upward from 150,000 in 1995 to 600,000 
in 2007. Prices also increased quickly: according to data from the Spanish Ministry 
of Housing, between 1998 and the peak of the boom in 2008, nominal housing 
prices increased by 175 percent, compared to a 61.5 percent increase in Spain’s 
consumer price index.
Because the growth in deposits was not enough to cope with the lending boom, 
the cajas resorted to wholesale funding on an unprecedented scale. Because the 
loans were euro-denominated and against physical collateral (real estate assets), 
international institutions were able and willing to lend. The growth of this sector 
was not accompanied by improvements in cajas’ governance. Cajas did not have 
shareholders: instead, they were governed by a board selected by the regional and 
local governments, employees, and clients. These boards were the perfect target for 
takeovers by low-human-capital managers with the right political alliances and who 
could fi nance politically motivated projects. Cuñat and Garicano (2009, 2010) show 
that the human capital of managers in the cajas was low and that those cajas where 
human capital was particularly low had the highest amounts of real estate lending 
and nonperforming loans.
On May 9, 2012, the collapse of Bankia—a banking giant that was the product 
of the hurried-up merger of Caja Madrid, Bancaja, and several other smaller cajas 
with assets equal to 33 percent of Spanish output—led directly to Spain’s request 
for a bailout from the European Union. The way in which Bankia came to an 
ignominious end is a vivid story of institutional deterioration triggered by the real 
estate boom.
Jesús Fernández-Villaverde, Luis Garicano, and Tano Santos     155
Caja Madrid was one of the oldest cajas. For the fi rst decade after the passage of 
the 1985 law discussed earlier, Caja Madrid was run with the consensus of the main 
political parties of the high-income region of Madrid. Its head, Jaime Terceiro, 
managed the entity professionally and made Caja Madrid a fi erce competitor in 
the credit market. However, in 1996, the conservative party pooled its votes with 
those of a trade union and took control of Caja Madrid. Terceiro was replaced 
by Miguel Blesa, a close friend of the newly elected prime minister.4 Starting in 
1996, Caja Madrid expanded aggressively, not just in real estate but also in strategic 
segments of corporate Spain. Eventually, as this complex web of politics, fi nance, 
and business interests thickened, Blesa was forced to step down by the head of the 
regional government of Madrid, who unsuccessfully nominated a close political ally 
with no experience in banking as the head of Caja Madrid. After some infi ghting, 
another powerful politician and former IMF managing director, Rodrigo Rato, 
was appointed. He ran the entity until its nationalization with a board composed 
entirely of politically connected appointees.
The other half of what was to become Bankia was Bancaja, the main caja in the 
region of Valencia. It was born in 1878 and had stayed local for most of its history. 
Only around 1997, with the real estate bubble in its incipient stage, did it start a 
breakneck expansion after the Valencia regional government modifi ed the law in 
a way that essentially handed control of the caja to the local government. In addi-
tion this law vested supervisory authority in a local entity, the “Valencian Institute of 
Finance,” which was an arm of the regional government without any supervisory capa-
bility at the time. Few anecdotes could illustrate the unhealthy connection between 
politics and fi nance better than the fact that the person appointed as president of 
Bancaja when the real estate bubble got going in earnest was José Luis Olivas—the 
same politician who, as Valencia’s fi nance minister, drafted the l997 law regulating 
the local cajas (and who, in the meantime, had also been president of the regional 
government). Olivas had no experience whatsoever in banking. Bancaja soon 
became an instrument of the region’s political aims in several areas such as housing, 
energy, telecommunications, and entertainment. Over the next decade, Bancaja 
would participate in fi nancing all of the major infrastructure projects of the Valencia 
government, including the Formula 1 in Valencia (at a cost of €244 million), the 
Castellón Airport (€200 million, although a plane has yet to land there), and Terra 
Mitica (€300m, an amusement park that entered bankruptcy in 2004). The bursting 
of the real estate bubble has brought to light numerous corruption scandals in this 
otherwise wealthy region of Spain.
When problems started in 2009, Caja Madrid and Bancaja were merged into a 
large systemic institution, Bankia, dominated by the same political interests that had 
4 The agreement between the conservatives (Popular Party or PP) and the trade union (Comisiones 
Obreras or CC.OO.) was published and openly discussed in the Spanish press. For example, see “El PP 
modifi cará la Ley de Cajas de Madrid para cumplir el compromiso con CC.OO.” or “CC.OO. y el 
PP rubrican el acuerdo para que Blesa presida Cajamadrid,” El País, September 7, 1996.
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been running both entities. Two bad cajas do not make a good bank, and Bankia was 
effectively nationalized in the spring of 2012.
Ireland: A Procyclical Fiscal and Regulatory Policy
After a deep recession and huge budget defi cits in the late 1970s and early 
1980s, Ireland introduced important economic policy reforms in the second half 
of the 1980s. Also, a consensus emerged among the political parties for reducing 
budget defi cits and tax rates. Reforms in labor market institutions—combined with 
persistent high unemployment—kept real wage growth below that of Ireland’s 
major trading partners. Strategic sectors of the economy were liberalized, such as 
air transport (Barrett 1997) and the telecommunication system (Burnham 2003), 
which at the time was reputed to be the worst in Western Europe. These reforms 
helped to deliver real annual output growth that averaged more than 6 percent 
from 1987 to 2000.
However, Ireland’s growth relied mostly on an increase in hours worked, while 
productivity was growing at a rate similar to that of other European countries.5 
In 1989, Ireland had the lowest employment/population ratio in the OECD at 
31 percent (Whelan 2010) due to high unemployment and a late baby boom. But 
by 2000, additional labor as a source of growth was essentially exhausted.
However, real interest rates dropped throughout the 1990s, from roughly 
4 percent in the mid 1990s to negative values from 1998 to 2002—that is, for the 
early years of the euro’s existence. Not surprisingly, this led to an increase in valua-
tions and a higher private investment in housing. In the 1990s, Ireland combined a 
high incidence of owner occupation with the smallest number of dwellings relative 
to its population in the European Union (Somervile 2007). Thus, the “Celtic Tiger” 
years started with an abnormally low stock of housing. Construction accelerated, 
with house completions going from 19,000 in 1990 to 50,000 in 2000 and to 93,000 
in 2006. The ratio of house prices to disposable income remained stable until the 
second half of the 1990s, when it started a growth spurt that would take the ratio 
from 7 to 12 in less than a decade (Whelan 2010, fi gure 8). Soon, Ireland was the 
country with the highest share of housing investment in gross capital formation 
of any country in the eurozone, and construction became the dominant sector 
driving growth and employment. By 2007, 13.3 percent of all employment was in 
the construction sector; for comparison, in the United Kingdom and the United 
States, that same number never rose above 8 percent. Thus, instead of transitioning 
from growth based on increased employment to growth based on productivity gains, 
Ireland instead embarked on a massive speculative cycle in the construction sector.
5 The measure of productivity growth referred to here controls for the effect of multinationals that book 
a large fraction of their international profi ts in Ireland to benefi t from low taxation (Honohan and 
Walsh 2002, fi gure 13).
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In the meantime, rather than seeking to counterbalance the bubble, govern-
mental policy in Ireland accentuated it through a procyclical fi scal policy and 
regulatory and tax changes that made real estate development even more attrac-
tive. We interpret these changes as evidence of a deterioration in institutions 
and governance.
First, fi scal policy was markedly procyclical: government expenditures in 
Ireland doubled in real terms between 1995 and 2007. The income tax was cut 
several times until Ireland reached a stunning income tax and employee contribu-
tion average rate of 6.7 percent of gross wage earnings for a single-earning married 
couple with two children. Ireland already had highly generous tax provisions for 
owner-occupied housing, being the only OECD country combining a tax deduc-
tion for mortgage interest payments with no property tax, capital gains tax, or 
imputed rent tax (Rae and van de Noord 2006, p. 8). Even so, tax incentives for the 
real estate sector increased (Honohan 2010). Stamp duties (a sale tax on homes) 
were lowered in 2001, 2002, 2003, 2005, and 2007, while the ceiling on income 
tax deductibility of mortgage interest was increased in 2000, 2003, and 2008. Tax 
concessions were granted for urban renewal, multistory car parks, student accom-
modations, nursing homes, hotels, and holiday camps. A special incentive tax rate 
for developers between 2000 and 2007 sought to free up land for development by 
taxing the proceeds at 20 percent rather than at the higher 42 percent that had 
prevailed before (Byrne 2012).
Second, several major legislative changes worsened the quality of fi nancial 
supervision. The 2003 act that established the Central Bank and Financial Services 
Authority of Ireland (CBFSAI) divided supervisory responsibilities between the 
newly created Irish Financial Services Regulatory Authority (IFSRA) and the Central 
Bank of Ireland. This reorganization contributed to the lax banking supervision 
that characterized this period and which forced the (re)establishment of a single 
fully integrated regulatory institution in June 2009. Bertie Ahern, Ireland’s former 
prime minister, pointed to this regulatory overhaul as the main culprit in the crisis 
(Brown 2009).
This new regulatory framework perniciously interacted with a particular 
development in the Irish banking sector: the emergence of Anglo Irish Bank. In 
1999, total assets of Anglo were less than 10 percent of Ireland’s GDP; by 2007, total 
assets were 55 percent of Ireland’s GDP, transforming Anglo into a systemic risk for 
Ireland. This phenomenal expansion was rooted in a business model that empha-
sized speed in loan approval and a disregard of applicable bank rules. A customer 
could apply to Anglo for a loan of several million euros for a property develop-
ment project on a Monday and receive approval by the end of the week (Carswell 
2011). Anglo raised funds in international wholesale markets and loaned heavily 
to a small number of borrowers in the property development sector. Other Irish 
banks reacted to Anglo by loosening standards. The problems at Anglo Irish were 
in plain sight for the regulators. However, as documented in the Nyberg Report 
(Nyberg 2011), neither the management of Anglo Irish nor its Board could recall a 
meaningful engagement with the regulators on prudential issues. As Whelan (2010) 
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emphasizes, the collapse of the Irish banking system was not related to fi nancial 
innovations nor to regulatory arbitrage, but to a failure of supervisory oversight over 
credit concentration risk and fragile funding. It was, simply, low-quality governance 
(for accounts of the rise and fall of Anglo Irish Bank, see Carswell, 2011; Lyons and 
Carey, 2011; Nyberg, 2011).
Why the tolerant government policy toward the boom? Given that underlying 
problems had been diagnosed by international organizations such as the IMF 
and the OECD and by Irish economists (Honohan and Walsh 2002), why did the 
government add more fuel to the fi re? The Irish political class, confronted with 
an unpleasant growth slowdown, preferred to delay any corrective actions. From 
1997 to 2007, 35 percent of disclosed donations to Fianna Fail—the party in govern-
ment—were from property developers and the construction industry (Byrne 2012). 
Adding hotels (9 percent) and banks and insurance companies (5 percent) shows 
that 49 percent of disclosed donations were from parties that had a direct interest in 
the real estate bubble. The coalition of interest groups and an electorate demanding 
easier access to housing was too powerful to resist.
The extraordinarily close relationship between Ireland’s bankers, developers, 
and government was at the heart of the unprecedented decision to provide a blanket 
government guarantee of all Irish bank debt on September 30, 2008. This policy 
included all existing and new debt and all deposits, including corporate and even 
interbank deposits, covered bonds, senior debt, and some subordinated debt. Just 
why and how this decision was made remains shrouded in mystery (Honohan 2010, 
chap. 8).6 While this decision was perhaps just a mistake by an exhausted cabinet 
taking a hard decision at the worst moment, it is true that as Byrne (2012, p. 202) 
points out, the “[k]ey political decisions were insulated from critical debate because 
they were executed within a closed and cartelized system which facilitated regula-
tory capture.” In Ireland, the political economy factors helped to foster a policy in 
which the government bailed out private creditors from their mistakes during the 
boom and subsequent crisis, with enormous consequences for the welfare of future 
Irish taxpayers.
Greece: Sustaining the Unsustainable
In the decade after accession to the euro, Greece enjoyed growth rates over 
2 percent in every year from 2000 to 2008, peaking at almost 6 percent in the pre-
Olympic year of 2003. This growth was based on fi nancial liberalization coupled with 
membership in the monetary union, strong export growth, and the fi scal stimulus 
associated with the Olympic Games. Mitsopoulos and Pelagidis (2012) add to these 
6 The rating companies did not see it as an error. For instance, Fitch affi rmed the AAA rating on Ireland 
following the guarantee decision, stating: “This proactive measure should help buttress confi dence in 
the Irish fi nancial system and limit the risks of a deeper and more-prolonged-than necessary recession at 
a time of unusual stress in global banking markets” (Bloomberg 2008).
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factors improvements in the regulation of some segments of the product markets, 
such as telecommunications (transportation and energy remained noncompetitive).
Yet the imbalances building in the Greek economy were there for all to see. 
The current account defi cit, already at almost 8 percent in 2000, reached 15 percent 
in 2008 and was still 9.8 percent in 2011. As a result, net external debt rose from 
42.7 percent of output in 2000 to 82.5 percent in 2009. This current account defi cit 
was not, as in Ireland and Spain, the counterpart of large infl ows of money into the 
private sector. The entirety of Greece’s net external debt is accounted for by the public 
sector, which by 2009 had debt that exceeded GDP.
Greece’s unsustainable situation had been developing since 1980, with yearly 
average government defi cits over 8 percent of output in the 1980s and 1990s and 
current account defi cits of over 10 percent in both the 1990s and the 2000s. In 2004, 
the Greek electorate gave a strong mandate to the New Democracy party (after 
11 years of PASOK rule) to tackle the many problems affl icting the Greek economy, 
but the results were disappointing at best. In this sense, Greece is the poster child 
for postponed adjustment. Greece’s curse, more than any of the other peripheral 
countries, was the problem of an unreformed economy. A report on Greek gover-
nance in June 2012 by the OECD, an organization that (like other international 
organizations) tends to pull its punches in public, wrote: “The combination of 
these factors—a weak Centre of Government, legal formalism, the absence of basic 
data, the lack of evidence-based policy making and an undeveloped HR [human 
resources] strategy—has created an environment conducive to rent seeking” (OECD 
2011). Mitsopoulos and Pelagidis (2012, p.  131) argue that Greece is a country 
with almost fi rst-class per capita output but second-class governance, institutions, 
business environment, and corruption. The evidence of institutional deterioration 
in Greece is widespread, from the decreasing reliability of government statistics to 
a drop in the corruption ranking from Transparency International from position 
number 35 in 2000 to number 78 by 2010.
How can a country in the heart of the European Union, under pressure from a 
common currency, avoid the most basic reforms? For no country was the arrival of 
the euro as large a boon as for Greece. In 1994, the interest on the 10- year bond had 
reached almost 22 percent. By June 2003, the combination of the global lending 
boom and the perceived disappearance of currency and default risk meant that 
Greece was paying an unprecedented 3.6 percent.
Although the examples of arrested reforms that followed are many, one of 
the clearest is the pension system. Greece’s pension system was, by 2009, designed 
to replace 95.7 percent of the fi nal income level, the highest replacement ratio 
among high-income countries (OECD 2009). Public pension expenditures were 
12 percent of GDP and are projected to rise to an incredible 24 percent of GDP 
by 2050 (compared to a rise from 8  percent of GDP in 2010 to 12  percent of 
GDP by 2050 in the OECD). Moreover, the system was extremely fragmented, with 
236  separate funds in 2003 (O’Donnell and Tinios 2003). Beyond the multiple 
ineffi ciencies and duplications this fragmentation caused, it also had a negative 
effect on labor mobility, as moving jobs often meant losing previous entitlements. 
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Finally, the pension system was extremely unequal, with large privileges handed 
to the professions and the public-sector employees. As a result, despite the high 
spending levels, the poverty risk for pensioners in Greece was 2.3  times larger 
than for the general population (versus 1.2  times in the European Union as a 
whole). In short, Greece’s pension problem was considerably larger than that in 
other countries.
Some reforms had taken place in 1992 when the budget was under serious 
strain, but they did not tackle the long-term imbalances. Then, in the run-up to 
joining the euro, the government was under pressure to undertake these reforms 
and in 2001 tried to pass a reform package that had fi rst been proposed in 1958 and 
was already considered at that time “extremely urgent” (Börsch-Supan and Tinios 
2001). This proposal involved hard choices: “The retirement age was to be raised; 
the required insurance period for a seniority pension increased; the replacement 
rate reduced to 60 percent of reference earnings; the minimum pension raised 
but means-tested; and the lower retirement age for mothers of younger children 
replaced” (Featherstone 2005). However, in the face of massive protests, with the 
country booming and all sense of urgency gone, the proposals were withdrawn. 
A new reform package, characterized by creative accounting and little real reform, 
sailed through Parliament in 2002. Pension and other economic reforms were aban-
doned and not taken up again until it was too late to avert the crisis.
Portugal: Neither Demand for Reform nor Supply of Reform
After 15 years of economic growth that followed its accession to the European 
Union, Portugal’s economy started to stagnate around 2000. Shockingly, in 2012, 
Portugal’s output was lower than in 2001. For comparison, Spain’s output was still 
nearly 17 percent higher in 2012 than in 2001 and Ireland’s output was 19 percent 
higher. Portugal’s total factor productivity fell in every year between 1999 and 
2005 (see the KLEMS data set described in O’Mahony and Timmer 2009). The 
prime suspects for this drop include restrictions to competition in many sectors, 
the dominant position of large fi rms in several key industries, the diffi culties for 
foreign management that sought to take over low-productivity Portuguese fi rms, 
and a dysfunctional labor market.
Portugal faced major macroeconomic imbalances, too. The headline govern-
ment budget defi cit never fell below 2.9 percent of GDP and the primary balance 
(government net borrowing or lending) was constantly in defi cit, even after 
controlling for the effects of the business cycle and one-off and temporary adjust-
ments (Marinheiro 2006, updated 2011). Public debt accumulated as a result, 
from 51.2 percent of output in 2001 to 92.4 percent in 2010. The private sector 
responded to the stagnant economic outlook by reducing its saving rate and heavily 
borrowing from abroad to fi nance current consumption, while investment actu-
ally fell as a percentage of national demand. This translated into persistent current 
account defi cits of between 6 to 12 percent of output, an acute deterioration in the 
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real exchange rate, and an increasingly negative net asset position, mostly held by 
banks that had borrowed abroad to lend to local households.
In short, the behavior of both the public and the private sector was unsustain-
able in the middle run, a point well-recognized by many economists at the time. 
However, accession to the euro allowed both the public and the private sector to 
postpone the day of reckoning. In particular, the euro brought historically low 
nominal interest rates. For example, the yield on the 10-year government bond fell 
from 12 percent in 1995 to slightly less than 4 percent by early 2005. Consequently, 
while government debt as a share of GDP rose by 41 percentage points, interest paid 
on the debt barely budged: it was 2.9 percent of GDP in 2000 and 3.0 percent of 
GDP in 2010. The amount of private debt, and the interest payments on that debt, 
followed a similar pattern. Again, accession to the euro allowed Portugal’s political-
economic equilibrium to be sustained in the middle run by the large capital infl ows 
from the rest of the world, even if a correction was eventually unavoidable.
There was no push for reform in Portugal because there was no “demand” for 
it, even less a “supply.” On the demand side, a broad coalition that cut across tradi-
tional party lines supported the status quo. Large fi rms were reluctant to accept 
the liberalization of the markets for goods and services, entrenched managers 
were unwilling to be replaced by newcomers, inside workers resisted attempts to 
introduce more effi cient labor regulations, and many low-income households 
benefi ted from increased social transfers (a rise of 4 points of GDP from 2000 to 
2005) that succeeded in reducing Portugal’s large income inequality and poverty 
rates. The inheritance from Portugal’s historical pattern of inward development 
and the constraints created by the sudden change to democracy in 1974 made 
this coalition especially powerful and limited the scope of a more dynamic export 
sector that could have supported reforms.7
From the supply side, Portugal’s parliamentary system created by the 1976 
constitution provides little incentive for cooperation among the main political 
agents and makes decisive reforms diffi cult to approve. First, Portugal divides 
executive power between the president and the prime minister to a larger extent 
than other European countries, thus lacking the virtues of either purer presiden-
tial systems, such as France, or parliamentarian systems, such as Germany. As one 
example of this dysfunction, President Jorge Sampaio called for an early parlia-
mentary election in 2005, an election centered to a large extent on the economic 
policies that Portugal needed to reactivate its economy, despite the fact that the 
government at the time held a solid parliamentary majority. Second, the electoral 
law, based on proportional representation, makes it hard for a single party to win an 
outright majority and forces coalition governments. Third, the power of the prime 
7 See Bermeo (2002) for the strong support of Portuguese voters for aggressive redistribution policies; 
Costa, Lains, and Miranda (2011) for a discussion of Portugal’s historical pattern of growth; Fishman 
(2005) for the long-run political-economic consequences of the Revolution of Carnations of 1974; and 
Torres (2006), for the reluctance of important sectors of Portuguese elites to adopt the euro.
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minister has been curtailed by the need to placate widely different constituencies 
(for example, in the Social Democratic Party ranging from right to center left).
When the economic crisis hit Portugal in 2008, private capital fl ows largely 
stopped. Portuguese banks, deeply exposed to sovereign debt of their own govern-
ment, cut loans to fi rms, and the feedback loop from lower economic activity into 
lower tax revenue and higher sovereign risk left Portugal in a deep recession and 
with a banking sector in urgent need of recapitalization.
Even though exports have increased, the fi xed exchange rate has prevented 
a faster adjustment and the current account still presents a substantial defi cit that 
requires fresh external fi nancing. At the same time, the institutional barriers we 
identifi ed above, including the lack of a broad coalition supporting reform and the 
constitutional arrangements, have not been removed.
Germany: Without Financial Bubbles, Reforms Are Possible
In the years after the introduction of the euro, Germany undertook painful 
reforms of its welfare state. Why did the euro not have the same effect in Germany 
as in the peripheral countries like Spain, Ireland, Greece, and Portugal—namely, to 
postpone reforms? The answer is implied by the paths of interest rates shown earlier 
in Figure 1: neither the euro nor the fi nancial boom changed fi nancial conditions 
in Germany. For Germany, the euro meant tighter budgetary and fi scal constraints, 
not looser fi nancial conditions. Absent the leeway provided by a fi nancial boom, 
politicians had no choice but to act.
A decade ago, Germany was the “sick man” of Europe. The average growth rate 
in the second half of the 1990s and fi rst years of the euro was barely above 1 percent. 
Unemployment in Germany stayed stubbornly high and had reached 11 percent in 
2005. In addition, Germany was aging more rapidly than countries like Ireland and 
Spain; in Germany, the share of the population between 15 and 64 years of age peaked 
in 1987 at slightly above 70 percent and then started a steady decline. The sorry state 
of the East German economy and the diffi culties of unifi cation only added to the chal-
lenges (Akerlof, Rose, Yellen, and Hessenius 1991); indeed, while Spain and Ireland 
were enjoying real estate booms, Germany’s housing prices were declining by about 
10 percent from 1996 up through 2006.
This mediocre economic performance, the negative demographic trends, and 
the costs of the reunifi cation shock put the German welfare state under severe strain. 
Compared with other countries, Germany’s labor market policies were character-
ized by high expenditures and long duration of programs. Since social insurance 
schemes were essentially paid by employees, a decline in hours worked made the 
situation dire ( Jacobi and Kluve 2007). Germany’s unifi cation exacerbated an 
already problematic state of affairs. Indeed, between 1990 and 1998 social insurance 
contribution rates for unemployment, health care, and pensions increased from 
35.5 percent to 42.1 percent; German unifi cation accounted for about half of that 
increase (Streeck and Trampusch 2005, p. 176). Even with the rise in contribution 
Jesús Fernández-Villaverde, Luis Garicano, and Tano Santos     163
rates, additional and growing federal subsidies from general tax revenue were 
required to fi nance up to one-quarter of the programs.
German politicians faced severe constraints. Monetary policy was under the 
control of the European Central Bank, which was establishing its reputation by 
setting a monetary policy for a newly created euro area and was unwilling to concede 
to the wishes of German politicians. The political fragmentation associated with 
German federalism prevented expansionary demand policies (Manow and Seils 
2000). Because of the wide coverage of unions, real wage fl exibility was limited. 
Reforms had long been slow in coming (Hassel 2010). In 1997, Chancellor Helmut 
Kohl introduced reforms aimed at stabilizing contribution rates to social insurance 
programs by including the use of demographic factors to account for increases in 
life expectancy, but these measures led to him being voted out of offi ce in 1998, and 
the changes were reversed. Gerhard Schröder’s fi rst term as Chancellor was charac-
terized by policies similar to those of other countries confronted with unsustainable 
welfare states: that is, a commitment to maintain benefi ts.
Unpopular reform was the only road left open. As Streeck and Trampusch (2005, 
p. 181) emphasize, “[h]aving stretched the federal budget to its limits, the measures 
of 1999 unintentionally forced the government to consider structural reform that 
went beyond short-term fi scal remedies.” Schröder launched the Agenda 2010 
program, the core of which was the Hartz I– IV reforms that constitute the greatest 
overhaul of the German welfare state since World War II. The Hartz reforms came 
only after much resistance—and a serious corruption scandal that fi nally forced the 
issue on the sitting cabinet—and probably cost Schröder the 2005 election (Helms 
2007). The reforms changed a core principle of the German welfare state: whereas 
the system prevailing prior to these reforms was meant to preserve the social status 
of workers through retraining and public work schemes, the new system empha-
sized instead quick and sustainable job placement (see Bruttel and Sol, 2006, for the 
historical evidence on the adoption of “work fi rst” approaches). In particular, job 
seekers were required to accept any offer of “suitable” work, where the defi nition of 
suitable was considerably broadened.
The long-run effects of the Hartz reforms are still being debated ( Jacobi and 
Kluve 2007). But it is undeniable that, for Germany, joining the eurozone did not 
loosen budget constraints, but it did led to sweeping labor market reforms.
Conclusions
Many observers expected the arrival of the euro to lead to economic reform: 
when national governments lacked monetary autonomy and had only limited fi scal 
autonomy, they would face greater pressure to adopt structural reforms that they 
previously had refused to implement. Instead, nations in the periphery of Europe 
experienced a fi nancial boom derived from the drop in interest rates and exchange 
rate risk. The budget constraints for these countries were loosened, rather than 
tightened. Moreover, both public and private accountability was diminished during 
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the boom because the consequences of bad decisions are largely imperceptible, at 
least in the short run, when rising asset prices hide all mistakes.
The line of argument we have pursued suggests several avenues for future 
research. First, while case studies can help to analyze the mechanisms at play, a more 
systematic empirical analysis of public and private governance during changing 
fi nancial conditions is necessary to test our theory. Second, our hypothesis on signal 
extraction during fi nancial booms needs to be formalized more fully. A fi nal issue 
concerns the broader applicability of our analysis. Are all situations where fi nancing 
is plentiful and cheap conducive to the lowering of standards, the deterioration of 
governance, and the postponement of needed economic reforms? If so, this situa-
tion is currently the one the United States, at the zero lower bound, is facing—in 
which case our analysis suggests that America’s citizens and policymakers should be 
especially vigilant about the evolution of public and private governance.
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